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The state owned enterprises were crucial in the early stage of industrial development 
in Turkey. They were producer of basic consumption goods and contributed the building the 
entrepreneurial understanding, and hence the development of the private sector.  State owned 
enterprises have played key role in almost all sectors of the Turkish economy, including 
manufacturing sectors and various infrastructural facilities.  After 1980, the radical 
transformation has occurred in Turkish economic policies: The reform process included not 
only financial liberalization and trade reforms, but also the privatization of the state owned 
enterprises.   
 
Initially, starting from the second half of 1980s, international organizations have 
advocated privatization as a “must” policy tool. The paper explores the effects of privatization 
on regional growth of Turkish manufacturing. The analyses are carried out at regional basis in 
order to detect to what extent the public sector is complement to or substitute of the private 
sector. The findings show that privatization has no perverse effects on the development of the 
manufacturing activities in the traditional and new industrial zones.  However, its effects are 
in opposite directions in the poor regions. 
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Privatization is not a panacea for solving poor economic performance. 




Throughout the period of 1930–1980, public investments in manufacturing, energy 
and mining sectors have been the engine of the industrialization in Turkey.  State owned 
enterprises have played leading role not only producing the consumption good which was 
absent before 1930’s, they were also main suppliers of the inputs for the private firms.   
During the early stages of the industrialization in Turkey, public investments in 
manufacturing had been the first non-primary economic activities in the most regions of the 
country, and the state owned enterprises accelerated the development of the market economy.  
Until recent years, state owned enterprises were still leading institutions particularly in the 
eastern part of Turkey.  In addition to their contribution to Turkish economy as producer, the 
state owned enterprises also contributed the development of the entrepreneurial understanding 
and served as a school to train workers.  
 
Starting from 1980, privatization became one of the primary objectives of the agenda 
of the Turkish policy makers.  Consequently, the share of state owned enterprises in Turkish 
manufacture has drastically decreased during the last three decades.  Privatization is a very 
controversial issue in the reform process of emerging and transition countries. While, initially, 
international organizations have recommended privatization without any reservation, in recent 
years this trust has been questioned.   
 
The supporters of privatization stress efficiency gains through privatization, and the 
opponents focus on the nexus between growth and privatization.  However, both sides either 
ignore economic and social externalities created by the public sector, or asymmetries resulting 
from the privatization within the country.  In this paper, we aim to scrutinize asymmetric 
implications of the privatization experienced after 1984 across the regions of Turkey.  We 
presume that the effects of the externalities created by the state owned enterprise may vary 
from region to region according to the degree of economic development:  In the less 
developed regions, the externalities may be effective in stimulating private initiatives through 
enlargement of the local good and factor markets and through institutional deepening. This 
mechanism can be defined as the existence of complementary role of state.  On the other 
hand, the scale advantage of state firms may hinder the entrance of private entrepreneurs, and 
the externalities created by the state firms can be suppressed.  In this case, private and public 
sectors are substitute of each other rather than complement. 
 
   One of the apparent outcomes of the privatization is the diminution of the share of the 
state enterprises in the regional manufacturing employment.  Higher value of this ratio shows 
that the state enterprises dominate the manufacturing activities within the region.   
Consequently, decrease in the ratio demonstrates to what extend the privatization is realized.  
The pre-privatization period of 1983-1985 is taken as the initial condition, and 1998-2000 is Dogruel&Dogruel, April 2011  3
the end years of the period covered in the analysis.  The spatial statistical techniques we 
employ reveal that the privatization has no effects on the manufacturing development in the 
industrial zones.  However, results show that this policy has hindered the development of 
manufacturing activities in poorly industrialized regions. For the analyses we employ the 
manufacturing data of annual manufacturing surveys of TURKSTAT (Turkish Statistical 
Institute).   
 
  The plan of the paper as follows: The second section outlines the main trends of the 
discussions on privatization, and the role of state in creating externalities.  The role of state 
owned enterprises in the Turkish Economy is discussed briefly in the third section.  The 




2. PRIVATIZATION AS A CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE  
 
  Privatization is a controversial issue in the discussions on the reform process of 
emerging and transition countries.
1  It has many proponents as well as opponents.  Formerly, 
starting from the second half 1980s, international organizations, especially the IMF and the 
World Bank, have advocated privatization emphasizing the importance in many issues such as 
enhancing efficiency and productivity of state-owned firms.  Privatization was the one of the 
leading policy advice of “Original” Washington Consensus.
2 The literature on privatization 
focuses on firm performance and microeconomic benefits, macroeconomic dimension and 
privatization strategies, labor market outcome, and use privatization revenue for debt payment 
or compensating current account deficit. 
 
  Theoretical discussions display ambiguity about the merit of privatization or private 
ownership, although empirical studies support private ownership in competitive markets 
(Shirley and Walsh, 2000).
3  Megginson and Netter (2001) emphasize the similar outcome by 
reviewing 61 empirical studies: they found that firm performance is better in privately owned 
firms than state owned enterprises.  Djankov and Murrell (2002) survey more than 100 
empirical studies on the effects of privatization in transition countries and market economies.  
We may stress two different outcomes of this study:  First, “…state ownership within 
                                                 
1 For latest findings about the privatization implementation in the world see Kikeri and Kolo (2005) 
2 “Original” Washington Consensus” based on the Brady Plan which has been prepared for the solving debt 
problem of Latin American Countries in 1989 (Kuczynski, 2003).  Stiglitz (2002: 53) states that; “Fiscal 
austerity, privatization, and market liberalization were the three pillars of Washington Consensus advice 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s.” However, the last decade has witnessed heavy criticism on the “Original” 
Washington Consensus, including from its creator of this policy recommendation. Williamson (2004) has self 
critics on the Original Washington Consensus. Dani Rodrik (2006: 973) criticized policy advices as:  
“… any well-trained and well-intentioned economist could feel justified in uttering the obvious truths of the 
profession: get your macro balances in order, take the state out of business, give markets free rein.”Stabilize, 
privatize, and liberalize" became the mantra of a generation of technocrats who cut their teeth in the developing 
world and of the political leaders they counseled.” 
3 Shirley and Walsh (2000) draw the attention to this outcome by surveying very large theoretical and empirical 
literature on privatization, and private and state ownerships. Dogruel&Dogruel, April 2011  4
traditional state firms is less effective than all other ownership types, except for worker 
owners who have a negative effect…”, and second “state ownership within partially-
privatized firms is surprisingly effective…” Djankov and Murrell (2002: 741).   Kikeri and 
Nellis (2004) emphasize the microeconomic benefits of privatization and they mention about 
improving firm performance for competitive sectors and also, with the appropriate policy and 
regulations, improving welfare effects of infrastructure privatization.  Bourguignon and 
Sepúlveda (2009) stress the “distributional effects of privatization.” 
 
  Skeptic views on privatization underline the effects of privatization at the 
macroeconomic level.  Regarding transition countries Godoy and Stiglitz (2006) emphasized 
the speed of privatization and assert that “…contrary to the earlier literature, the speed of 
privatization is negatively associated with growth…”  Joseph Stiglitz has further criticisms on 
the privatization-growth nexus and the speed of privatization.  He strongly calls attention to 
the fact that “… there are some important preconditions that have to be satisfied before 
privatization can contribute to an economy’s growth.  And the way privatization is 
accomplished makes a great deal of difference. (…)  Unfortunately, the IMF and the World 
Bank have approached the issue from a narrow perspective – privatization was to be pursued 
rapidly.  Scorecards were kept for the countries making the transition from communism to the 
market: those who privatized faster were given the high marks.  As a result, privatization 
often did not bring the benefits that were promised.  The problems that arose from these 
failures have created antipathy to the very idea of privatization.” (Stiglitz, 2002: 54).  
Bennett et al (2004) discuss the effect of alternative privatization strategies on growth for 
transition countries.  Bartolotti and and Perotti (2007) draw attention to the weak institutions.  
 
Faggio (2006) investigates the link between privatization strategies and employment 
level:  her results confirm that full privatization creates high job destruction in the privatized 
enterprises.  Another issue should be added to the ongoing debate is the welfare dimension of 
privatization.  Birdsall and Nellis (2002) examine the distributional effects of privatization in 
developing and transition countries and discuss “which groups have gained or lost” and the 
environments in which groups are gaining or losing.
4  William Easterly is also very skeptical 
about the gains of privatization:  He thinks that by selling profitable state enterprises, 
governments are “eating the future.” The other ways of “eating the future” are incurring debt 
and cutting investment in infrastructure (Easterly, 2002: 112).   The privatization process and 
corruption tend to move together in many countries.  Easterly (2002: 112) calls our attention 
to this issue as well, using a country case from Africa.  
 
  However, the paper does not deal with these issues such as firm performance or 
welfare gains or losses through privatization. Rather, it focuses on the complementary role of 
state in the less developed regions. We assume that the effects of externalities created by state 
owned enterprise varies across regions according to the degree of economic development. The 
market institutions are not strong in the lagged regions. In that case, the externalities created 
by state owned enterprises may be important tools to motivate local private entrepreneurship. 
                                                 
4 Later, Nellis (2003) refuted the negative effects of privatization on inequality and poverty. Dogruel&Dogruel, April 2011  5
State owned enterprises could also help the institutional deepening and improvement of local 
markets.  At this point, we may refer to Marshallian type externalities: Alfred Marshall has 
defined the environment that creates externalities (Marshall ([1890] 1920: Chapter 10).   
Krugman (1999) elucidated these externalities, and defined positive externalities as market 
size effects, thick labor markets and pure external economies.  Externalities are the main 
forces that lead to agglomeration formation. It is possible to classify externalities (i.e. 
Marshallian type) as “technological” and “pecuniary” externalities; Fujita and Thisse widely 
discuss these two types of externalities and they state that “… technological and pecuniary 
externalities are natural components of any complete explanation of economic clustering.” 
(Fujita and Thisse (2002: 299).
5 They also draw attention to the origin and the structure of 
two type externalities: “… the origin of pecuniary externalities is clearer” while”… 
technological externalities often have the nature of a black box” (Fujita and Thisse (2002: 
299).  We assume that the complementary role of state in the less developed regions may 
create both types of externalities.    
 
However, it is not possible to argue that the effect of state in economic activities is one 
dimensional: Scale advantage of state firms may discourage the entrance of private firms and 
dampens down the development of private activities.  Thus, state firms may create negative 
externalities in a region, which stimulate centrifugal forces. This can be defined as the case 
where state and private sectors are substitute. 
   
 
3. RISING AND DECLINING ROLE OF STATE IN TURKISH ECONOMY  
 
  At the beginning of 20
th century, Turkish manufacture was primitive, due to the war 
conditions in Anatolia.  The First World War and the Turkish War of Independence had 
destroyed the existing economic structure.  In addition to the war conditions, the migration of 
minority population, which has been decisive in the various parts of the economy, has created 
a huge skilled labor gap in the Turkish economy in those days.  In the early years of the 
Republic, the whole industry has consisted of small scale enterprises with two or three 
workers, except Istanbul, Izmir and Adana which had been the main industrial centers of the 
Ottoman Empire.  The minorities had large control on the production of basic tools and 
equipments as owners of small enterprises as well as skilled workers. The migration of 
minorities, especially the migration of the Greek people from Anatolia, has suspended large 
scale domestic trade and tradable agricultural production due to scarcity of equipments 
(Cecen, Dogruel and Dogruel, 1990: 6).  
 
  The lack of entrepreneurs has forced the government to create an entrepreneurial class. 
The merchants and the eşraf (the local Anatolian notables) have been the candidates for new 
businessmen.  This was not an easy task for the founders of the republic; some attempts have 
failed dramatically.  Just to illustrate with a story: The first sugar factory of the Republican 
                                                 
5 Fujita and Thisse (2002: Chapters 8 and 9) includes detailed explanations and models for technological and 
pecuniary externalities. Dogruel&Dogruel, April 2011  6
Era was founded by a private entrepreneur in the western part of Turkey.  The sugar plant was 
constructed with the government loans.  Nevertheless, after few years, the owner has 
abandoned the plant due to the lack of skilled workers and the shortage of high-quality row 
materials.  Afterward, the government has been forced to take over the control of the sugar 
factory (Dogruel and Dogruel, 2006: Chapter 4.2).   
 
  Consequently, in 1920s and 1930s, in the early phases of the industrial history of 
Turkey, the state has acted as an entrepreneur in many areas, such as sugar, tobacco, iron and 
steel and so forth.   Public leadership in industrialization has started relatively earlier in 
Turkey.  Shirley and Walsh (2000) state that: “state ownership experienced a period of 
popularity among developed nations in the 1930’s, 1940’s and 1950’s, and in developing 
nations throughout the postwar period.”  Surprisingly, in 1950s, rising demands from private 
entrepreneurs to liberalize the economy and to privatize the state firms were creating 
unbearable pressure on the governments.
6  The discussions are basically carried out by 
referring to political concepts rather than economic ones, such as the paternalistic nature of 
the state, need for liberal political and economic structure.   The problem however was 
beyond the political dimension:   Lack of capital, insufficient entrepreneurial experiences and 
scarcity of qualified workers were crucial obstacles on the industrialization and economic 
development.  Therefore, the presence of the state owned enterprises were inevitable in this 
period, and we have seen the state firms not only producers of basic consumption goods, but 
also main domestic producer of the essential inputs for the manufacturing. Turkey has 
implemented a successful import substitution strategy by maintaining state support.  
 
  However, the presence of the state owned enterprises in the Turkish economy was not 
only an instrument for industrialization; at the same time this policy had some spatial effects.  
In the early periods, state presence in production activities via state owned enterprises has 
stimulated indirectly development of local market in the lagged regions of Turkey. As Fujita 
and Thisse (2002: 299) highlighted, technological and pecuniary externalities matter for 
efficiency of the market outcome.  And, the state owned enterprises contributed to the 
development of the market by stimulating demand in the region. It is possible to describe 
these effects as complementary externalities.  TEKEL,( tabac monopoly) has been one of the 
state owned enterprise that stimulate formation of market mechanisms in the poor regions as 
well as creating employment and improving skill level. 
 
In 1980, following the severe crises of the late 1970s, Turkey has implemented a 
comprehensive stabilization program.  The government also adopted a new industrialization 
policy where the import substitution strategy was replaced by export promotion strategy.   
Trade liberalization and financial liberalization are the main policy changes during the two 
decades following 1980.   
 
                                                 
6 In the 1948 Turkish Economic Congress, state intervention has strongly criticized and the delegates of the 
Congress have discussed “how the presence of the government can be removed from the economy?” (DPT, 
1997). Dogruel&Dogruel, April 2011  7
The stabilization program also had massive privatization targets.  The government has 
decided to withdraw gradually from production of goods, and the privatization 
implementation has started in 1984.
7  At the early years of the reform, the implementation of 
privatization was slow.  The governments could not abruptly end the presence of the state in 
the economy.  From 1986 to the end of 2009, more than two decades, privatization revenue 
totaled about 38.7 billion dollars.  More than three-quarters of total privatization revenue was 
received during the last five years (Figure-1).
8  The privatization efforts before 2001 was 
basically concentrated in food manufacturing (311 and 312), manufacture of textile (321), 
manufacture of wood products (331), manufacture of nonmetallic products (369), and 
manufacture of transport equipments (384).
9 
 
  This slow speed of privatization before 2000s may be attributed largely to the political 
unwillingness.  The state owned enterprises in the Turkish economy were very powerful tools 
to control the economy at the hand of political and bureaucratic elites.  Turkish political elites 
tend to use all available tools to reallocate the investable funds and to dictate their priorities to 
the entrepreneurs (Dogruel and Dogruel, 1994).  Another reason behind the unwillingness 
may be the uneven industrial development in different geographic regions of Turkey.   
Regional disparities are immense in Turkey
10, and eastern side of the country has been 
suffering from economic backwardness throughout the decades.  The openness did not change 
this situation.  Regional distribution of private manufacturing sector did not change 
substantially (Dogruel and Dogruel, 2011).  Food manufacturing (311 and 312) and 
manufacture of textile (321) are the only manufacturing activities in poor regions.  Despite the 
relatively large privatization in these sectors, there still are number of regions where state has 
more than 50 % share in manufacturing value added and employment in 2000 (Table A1 and 
A2).  It is possible to deduce that the political and bureaucratic elites may be reluctant to 
speed up the privatization due to its unpredictable social and political consequences. 
 
 
                                                 
7 Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry, Privatization Administration 
(http://www.oib.gov.tr/Privatizationinturkey.zip) 
8 Calculated using the data in Figure-1. 
9 The sectoral classification is ISIC Rev-2. 
10 An earlier study shows that major industrial zones has been located in the western part of Turkey (Dogruel, 
Dogruel and Kancal, 1992). Dogruel and Dogruel (2003) analyze the regional convergence in Turkey. This study 
concludes that only wealthy provinces located western regions of the country converge. This result shows that 
the regional differences did not change over decades.  There is a growing literature on regional differences and 
convergence issue in Turkey.  Here, we may cite some of them: among others Filiztekin (1998), Altinbas, Gunes 
and Dogruel (2002), Karaca (2004), Erlat (2005), Erlat and Ozkan (2006), Kirdar and Saracoglu (2006) and 
Yildirim and Ocal (2006).  Karahasan (2010) investigates dynamics and variation of firm formation at the 
regional level in Turkey. Considering methodological approach Erlat (2001) is another interesting study on the 
Turkish regional structure: it uses shift share analysis in order to examine “growth performance of the provinces” 
for 1975-1996 period.  Dogruel&Dogruel, April 2011  8
 
Source: Republic Of Turkey Prime Ministry Privatization Administration 
 
 
4. DATA AND QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS 
 
  In order to track the effects of the privatization on the manufacturing activities within 
the regions, we employ the manufacturing employment data of annual manufacturing surveys 
of TURKSTAT (Turkish Statistical Institute).  One of the apparent outcomes of the 
privatization is the diminution of the share of the state enterprises in the regional 
manufacturing employment.  The higher value of this ratio shows that the state enterprises 
dominate the manufacturing activities within the region. Consequently, decrease in the ratio 
demonstrates to what extend the privatization is realized. Data for the pre-privatization period 
of 1983-1985 give the initial condition. Figure-1 displays that the privatization 
implementations have been accelerated in the recent years following a slow privatization 
period. However, the main source of the increase in privatization revenues during the second 
half of 2000s is privatization of state owned enterprises in non-manufacturing sectors.  The 
modest privatization revenues before 2000 are received mainly from the privatization of 
manufacturing state enterprises. Therefore, we use latest available data for the years of 1988-
2000 in order to observe the degree and the effects of the privatization. Tables A1 – A5 in the 
appendix document the changes in the share of state owned enterprises in employment and 
value-added by regions, and the changes in the performances of the manufacturing sectors in 
the regions. Table-A6 gives the number of state firms by region.  
 
  If presence of the state in the region creates a crowding-out effect on the private 
initiatives, the manufacturing activities in the region should speed up following the 































































































































Figure 1: Privatization RevenuesDogruel&Dogruel, April 2011  9
expansion of the manufacturing activities at a higher rate than the national level. This can be 
considered as an existence of the substitution between private and public sectors.   
Alternatively, not only presence of state enterprises has a direct effect on the enlargement of 
the markets in a region, but they may also create externalities through inducing the 
institutional deepening.
11 In this case, privatization can hinder the growth of the 
manufacturing sector in the region, and as a result, the manufacturing share of the region in 
the country decreases. 
 
Value-added can be considered as an alternative indicator to employment. Value-
added data are reported as the market values by the TURKSTAT.  Since the prices of the 
productions of the state enterprises were basically controlled by the government during the 
period of 1983-2000, market values of these products vary with the political decisions.     
Therefore, we prefer employment data.  After 2001, the data handling method has been 
changed by TURKSTAT and the new data set is available for the years 2003, 2004, 2006 and 
2008 by regions.  However, due to the fundamental changes in the nature and the content of 
the surveys, the new series is not compatible with the old data.  Therefore, the analyses do not 
cover the post 2000 period.
12  
 
We classified 26 NUTS2 regions into five groups considering primarily their share in 
the total manufacturing employment as the average of the initial period 1983-1985 and of 
terminal period 1998-2000.  We also consider certain industrialization characteristics of the 
regions.  These are i) geographic location of the region, ii) whether a region is in the 
hinterland of another region or it is an industrial cluster, and iii) whether the region has an 
industrial tradition or not.  A region is called an industrial zone if its average employment 
share is greater than 4 percent.  Average employment shares in hinterlands and emerging 
regions are 3 to 4 percent, and they tend to increase during the period the paper covers.  
Hinterland region is the neighbor of an industrial zone.  In the New Geography Models, the 
formation and externality creation capacity of an agglomeration are related to these types’ 
proximities in a location.
13  Therefore, a region is called a hinterland region if it is in the 
hinterland of an industrial zone; otherwise, an emerging region if it is a cluster without any 
proximity to an agglomeration.   A region is called a minor industrial region if its average 
share of employment is above 1.5 percent and not classified as hinterlands and emerging 
regions.  The regions are classified as poorly industrial regions if their average shares of 
employment are below 1.5 percent (Table-1).  The map in Figure-2 illustrates the five 
industrial regions classified according to their manufacturing share and industrialization 
characteristics.  However, in the paper, emerging regions and minor industrial regions are 
evaluated jointly. 
  
                                                 
11 Zhao et al (2005: 5) state that the “Institutional development reduces the cost of doing business and promotes 
entrepreneurial entry. (…) The benefit of institutional improvement to institution-dependent existing firm we call 
the external reliance effect. That to potential entrants we call the entry push effect.” 
12 2001 is omitted due to the financial crisis. 
13 For the origin of the New Geography Model see Krugman (1991), and more comprehensive discussions are 
given in Fujita (2010). Dogruel&Dogruel, April 2011  10
Table-1: Industrial regions by industrialization characteristics 
Average share of manufacturing 
employment 
Industrial zones     1983-1985  1998-2000 
İstanbul TR10  30.42  27.08 
İzmir TR31  9.29  8.38 
Bursa, Eskişehir, Bilecik  TR41  7.73  11.82 
Kocaeli, Sakarya, Düzce, Bolu, Yalova  TR42  7.93  8.50 
Ankara TR51  5.61  5.23 
Adana, Mersin  TR62  6.15  4.21 
Regional total     67.14  65.23 
Hinterlands          
Tekirdağ, Edirne, Kırklareli TR21  2.91  6.03 
Manisa, Afyonkarahisar, Kütahya, Uşak TR33  3.13  3.73 
      6.04  9.77 
Emerging regions          
Aydın, Denizli, Muğla TR32  2.25  4.16 
Kayseri, Sivas, Yozgat  TR72  2.21  2.72 
Gaziantep, Adıyaman, Kilis  TRC1  1.19  2.25 
Regional total     5.66  9.14 
           
Minor industrial regions          
Balıkesir, Çanakkale  TR22  1.58  1.50 
Konya, Karaman  TR52  2.42  2.11 
Hatay, Kahramanmaraş, Osmaniye  TR63  2.38  1.85 
Zonguldak, Karabük, Bartın TR81  2.65  1.62 
Samsun, Tokat, Çorum, Amasya  TR83  2.79  1.80 
Trabzon, Ordu, Giresun, Rize, Artvin, Gümüşhane TR90  3.71  2.16 
Regional total     15.53  11.03 
Poorly industrialized regions          
Antalya, Isparta, Burdur  TR61  1.39  1.08 
Kırıkkale, Aksaray, Niğde, Nevşehir, Kırşehir TR71  0.58  1.11 
Kastamonu, Çankırı, Sinop  TR82  0.62  0.52 
Erzurum, Erzincan, Bayburt  TRA1  0.61  0.29 
Ağrı, Kars, Iğdır, Ardahan  TRA2  0.22  0.16 
Malatya, Elazığ, Bingöl, Tunceli  TRB1  1.30  1.07 
Van, Muş, Bitlis, Hakkari  TRB2  0.26  0.24 
Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır TRC2  0.39  0.24 
Mardin, Batman, Şırnak, Siirt  TRC3  0.25  0.12 
Regional total     5.63  4.83 
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in the regions. Contrary, the shares of these regions in total manufacturing employment 
slightly increased during the privatization period. The data shows that the privatization 
policies have no perverse effects on the development of the manufacturing sectors in this 
group of regions.  However, the increasing share of industrialization in these regions cannot 
be attributed solely to removal of the state enterprises.  Fast growing sectors are located in 
these regions.  As an exception in this group, we observe a decline in the share of employment 
created by the manufacturing sectors along with the privatization in Adana region (TR62).  
Considering the recent trend in this region, the weakening of the manufacturing is basically an 
outcome of the reallocation of the private sectors.  
 
 Tekirdağ (TR21) and Manisa (TR33) are selected as the hinterlands of the TR10 and 
TR31 respectively. Aydın (TR32), Kayseri (TR72) and Gaziantep (TRC1), are the regions 
which are emerged after 1980 as the new industrial centers. We observe significant decreases 
in the share of state owned enterprises in the employment of the manufacturing sectors. 
During the period of 1983-2000, these regions showed impressive improvements in private 
manufacturing production, and the share of these regions in total manufacturing employment 
and value-added increased. Since the basic source of the development came from private 
investments, it is natural to observe decreases in the share of public sector. However, 
considering decreasing the number of state owned enterprises, we can state that the 
privatization implementation in these regions is very effective. These results maintain our 
statement: there are definitely no externalities in these regions. Private sector has easily 
substituted the state firms, in addition to create new employment opportunities. These regions 
also show significant increase in their shares in the total manufacturing value added. 
 
Konya (TR52), Hatay (TR63), Zonguldak (TR81), Samsun (TR83), Trabzon (TR90) 
and Balıkesir (TR22) are classified as minor industrial regions.  Except Konya (TR52) these 
are not landlocked regions.  In this group, we select the regions which have a share in total 
employment or value added exceed 1.5 percent and not classified as hinterlands or emerging 
regions. We also consider the co-existences of private and public sectors before privatization.  
 
  Before privatization, except Balıkesir (TR22), the shares of state owned enterprises in 
the regional employment exceed about 70 percent.  The share of the state firms decrease to the 
half of the initial ratio in these regions except Trabzon (TR90). This figures show the public 
sector has played crucial role in the manufacturing activities, and the shares of state owned 
enterprises in these regions are still higher than that of the two groups discussed above. In 
spite of the modest privatization in these regions, the shares of these regions in total 
manufacturing employment decreased after privatization. Furthermore, in Zonguldak (TR81), 
Samsun (TR83) and Trabzon (TR90), not only shares, but also the level of employment 
capacity decreased. The findings prove that the externalities created by the state owned 
enterprises are effective in these regions. Privatization perversely effects the development of 
the manufacturing sectors in the region where industrial activities are not mature enough.  
 
Antalya (TR61), Kırıkkale (TR71), Kastamonu (TR82), Erzurum (TRA1), Ağrı 
(TRA2), Malatya (TRB1), Van (TRB2), Şanlıurfa (TRC2) and Mardin (TRC3) are classified Dogruel&Dogruel, April 2011  13
poorly industrialized regions.  This group consists of the regions in which the employment 
and value-added share in total do not exceed 1.5 percent and public sectors dominate their 
industrial structures.  In terms of privatization implementation, we can divide the group into 
two:  In the Antalya (TR61), Malatya (TRB1) and Şanlıurfa (TRC2) and Mardin (TRC3) we 
observe considerable privatization.  As we see in the minor industrial regions, privatization 
has negative effects in these regions. On the other hand, the privatization implementations are 
weak in Kastamonu (TR82), Erzurum (TRA1), Ağrı (TRA2) and Van (TRB2).  Thus, except 
Erzurum (TRA1), we do not observe any deterioration in the employment share of these 
regions.  These findings demonstrate how the presence of state owned enterprises are 
important in these poor regions. 
 
 
5. DECOMPOSITION OF REGIONAL MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT 
GROWTH 
 
In this section we present decomposition of manufacturing employment growth in the 
regions considering the private and the public manufacturing sectors as the component of the 
manufacturing activities.  The manufacturing employment data of annual manufacturing 
surveys of TURKSTAT is also used for the calculation of shift-share analysis.  Therefore, the 
period of the analysis ends in 2000.  As in Section 4, 1983-1985 is taken as pre-privatization 
period of the analysis. 
  
Shift-share analysis permits us to detect the sources of the variations in the regional 
growth of the economic activities.  The difference between the growth rate of a region (GR) 
and the national growth rate (NGR) is the sum of its two components: Industry mix effect 
(IME) and competitive effect (CE).
15   
 
GR - NGR = IME + CE 
or 
GR=NGR + IME + CE 
 
IME measures what would be the regional growth if each activity grows at the same rate as in 
the whole economy. If initially fast growing activities dominate the region one can expect that 
this region will benefit this advantage when composition of the economic activities remains 
constant. The other source of the difference between GR and NGR is the change in the 
composition of the economic activities in the region (CE) which can be calculate as a 
residual.
16   
                                                 
15 The shift-share analysis is a simple quantitative spatial technique.  The first use of the technique appear in 
Daniel B. Creamer, Industrial Location and National Resources (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1943) (quoted by Hoover and Giarratani, 1999: Appendix 12-1).  However, the landmark text was Regions, 
Resources and Economic Growth by Harvey S. Perloff, Edgar S. Dunn, Jr., Eric E. Lampard, and Richard F. 
Muth (The Johns Hopkins Press, 1960) (Riefler, 1984; Hoover and Giarratani, 1999: Appendix 12-1).    
 
16 “Mix-component” and “competitive component” are identical to the concepts defined by Dunn as “net 
proportionality shift” and “net differential shift” respectively (Hoover and Giarratani, 1999: Appendix 12-1).  Dogruel&Dogruel, April 2011  14
 
Private manufacturing employment in Turkey increased 1.65 fold from 1983-1985 to 
1998-2000.  However, public manufacturing employment declined to 48 percent of its initial 
level during the same period.  Therefore, we can define the private manufacturing sector as a 
fast growing part of the regional economic activities. Considering the growth rate differences 
between private and public sectors during the privatization policy, we think that the traditional 
(static) shift-share analysis may provide some insights for the evaluation of this policy. The 
static shift-share analysis uses the data of the beginning and the end years for the analysis. 
However, in order to reduce the risk of errors due to annual variations in the data, we 
calculate average of three years as beginning and ending values. The beginning and end 
values respectively are the averages of 1983-1985 and 1998-2000. Private and public 
manufacturing employments are used as the indicators of the regional economic activities. 
 
Decompositions of the regional employment growths are given in Table-2.  Except 
Manisa (TR33) and Kayseri (TR72), industry mix effects are positive in the industrial zones 
and hinterlands.  This shows that private manufacturing as the fast growing sector dominates 
the most of the advanced industrial regions of Turkey. Therefore, one can expect that the 
reducing share of the public sector through privatization should not deteriorate employment 
growth in these regions.  Manisa (TR33) and Kayseri (TR72), on the other hand, benefited 
from change in the composition of the manufacturing activities in favor of private sector 
(competitive effect).  Within these regions, only in Adana (TR62) competitive effect has 
negative value which suppresses its initial advantage.   
 
In contrast to advanced industrial regions, except Kastamonu (TR82) and Van (TRB2) 
growth rates of manufacturing employment in poorly industrial regions are well below the 
national growth rate either due to high either negative value of industry mix effects 
(dominated by the slow growing public sector) and/or insufficient gains through competitive 
effects, if there is any.  The findings of the shift-share analysis supports the results presented 
in the previous section based on the descriptive evaluation of the data.  
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Table 2: Decomposition of Regional Employment Growth 










TR10-Istanbul  14.42 28.47 25.45  -39.50
TR31-Izmir  15.87 28.47 8.51  -21.11
TR41-(Bursa, Eskisehir, Bilecik)  96.25 28.47 8.61  59.17
TR42-(Kocaeli, Sakarya, Duzce, Bolu, Yalova)  37.78 28.47 0.46  8.86
TR51-Ankara  19.65 28.47 -25.83  17.01
TR62-(Adana, Mersin)  -11.92 28.47 22.91  -63.29
              
Hinterlands and emerging regions             
TR21-(Tekirdag, Edirne, Kirklareli)  166.53 28.47 25.50  112.56
TR33-(Manisa, Afyonkarahisar, Kutahya, Usak)  52.78 28.47 -5.91  30.22
TR32-(Aydin, Denizli, Mugla)  137.57 28.47 1.87  107.23
TR72-(Kayseri, Sivas, Yozgat)  57.61 28.47 -10.45  39.59
TRC1-(Gaziantep, Adiyaman, Kilis)  141.93 28.47 5.06  108.40
Minor industrial regions 
TR52-(Konya, Karaman)  11.95 28.47 -37.24  20.72
TR63-(Hatay, Kahramanmaras, Osmaniye)  -0.06 28.47 -58.99  30.46
TR81-(Zonguldak, Karabuk, Bartin)  -21.58 28.47 -64.71  14.65
TR83-(Samsun, Tokat, Corum, Amasya)  -17.44 28.47 -45.34  -0.57
TR90-(Trabzon, Ordu, Giresun, Rize, Artvin, 
Gumushane)  -25.03 28.47 -56.97  3.47
TR22-(Balikesir, Canakkale)  21.85 28.47 -2.60  -4.02
TR71-(Kirikkale, Aksaray, Nigde, Nevsehir, Kirsehir)  146.49 28.47 1.38  116.63
Poorly industrialized regions 
TR61-(Antalya, Isparta, Burdur)  -0.01 28.47 -16.92  -11.56
TR82-(Kastamonu, Cankiri, Sinop)  8.67 28.47 -25.50  5.70
TRA1-(Erzurum, Erzincan, Bayburt)  -38.68 28.47 -56.96  -10.19
TRA2-(Agri, Kars, Igdir, Ardahan)  -5.49 28.47 -66.55  32.59
TRB1-(Malatya, Elazig, Bingol, Tunceli)  5.23 28.47 -58.10  34.86
TRB2-(Van, Mus, Bitlis, Hakkari)  15.96 28.47 -74.20  61.68
TRC2-(Sanliurfa, Diyarbakir)  -23.42 28.47 -54.59  2.70
TRC3-(Mardin, Batman, Sirnak, Siirt)  -38.52 28.47 -54.83  -12.16















  Our findings show that the effects of privatization on the manufacturing sector are not 
identical across regions in Turkey.  In the traditional and new industrial zones, privatization 
has no perverse effects on the development of the manufacturing activities.  On the contrary, 
probably due to the natural advantages, we saw that speed of industrialization in these regions 
accelerated.  However, in the poor regions, the effects of privatization are in opposite 
directions:  The share of these regions in total manufacturing employment and value-added 
decreased.  One can argue that the diversification in the spatial allocation of the 
manufacturing activities is a natural outcome of the economic policies implemented after 
1980.  However, even within the poor regions, data show that the deterioration of the 
distribution of the manufacturing activities is closely related with the degree of privatization.  
Therefore, we can state that the privatization implementation has increased the regional 
disparities; at least, it did not contribute to the development of poor regions of Turkey.   
 
  One of the weaknesses of the study is that the analyses presented do not cover the 
period after 2001 crisis. The data shows that the state still has a significant share in the 
manufacturing sector in 2000.  Although accelerated increase in privatization revenues after 
2005 is mainly due to the privatization of state owned enterprises in non-manufacturing 
sectors, privatization in manufacturing sector has been on the agenda of the policy makers.  
The years 2000s also witnessed the far-reaching policies adopted to cope with the financial 
crisis of 2001.  It is possible to expect that, in addition to privatization, the stabilization 
policies implemented after 2001 have deep effect on the regional distribution of the 
manufacturing activities in Turkey through the efforts to expand the exports.  Therefore, the 
change in the regional distribution of the manufacturing in Turkey can be considered largely 
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Table A1: Share of Public Sector in Manufacturing Employment by Regions 
(percent) 
Industrial zones      1983 1984 1985 1998  1999  2000 
İstanbul  TR10 9.92 9.38 8.56 2.80  3.02  2.41 
İzmir  TR31 23.79 23.94 23.66 12.99  13.99  12.75 
Bursa, Eskişehir, Bilecik  TR41 25.26 24.55 21.64  5.86  6.02  4.55 
Kocaeli, Sakarya, Düzce, Bolu, Yalova  TR42 32.40 29.89 29.85  8.31  7.48  7.24 
Ankara  TR51 55.05 54.40 50.57 12.88  13.72  12.99 
Adana, Mersin  TR62 10.48 11.20 12.70  9.34  9.13  8.23 
Hinterlands                      
Tekirdağ, Edirne, Kırklareli  TR21 9.23  10.56 7.89 1.56  1.72  1.56 
Manisa, Afyonkarahisar, Kütahya, Uşak  TR33 41.38 36.65 31.54 13.68  12.89  12.20 
Emerging regions                      
Aydın, Denizli, Muğla  TR32 30.41 29.95 28.16  4.20  3.93  3.42 
Kayseri, Sivas, Yozgat  TR72 36.07 40.84 42.26 20.96  18.18  15.97 
Gaziantep, Adıyaman, Kilis  TRC1 28.66 28.35 23.82  6.49  8.78  6.48 
     
Minor industrial regions                      
Balıkesir, Çanakkale  TR22 34.37 32.42 33.20 18.35  18.80  17.48 
Konya, Karaman  TR52 69.29 62.03 58.18 22.25  24.61  23.40 
Hatay, Kahramanmaraş, Osmaniye  TR63 82.79 82.45 79.82 38.73  37.25  36.89 
Zonguldak, Karabük, Bartın  TR81 87.31 87.59 84.86 36.38  35.83  38.38 
Samsun, Tokat, Çorum, Amasya  TR83 75.56 69.31 65.17 36.56  37.82  36.86 
Trabzon, Ordu, Giresun, Rize, Artvin, Gümüşhane  TR90 81.21 80.48 78.16 57.82  57.59  54.81 
Poorly industrialized regions                      
Antalya, Isparta, Burdur  TR61 46.57 46.85 43.52 16.36  15.03  13.82 
Kırıkkale, Aksaray, Niğde, Nevşehir, Kırşehir  TR71 23.21 35.15 30.34 52.23  52.61  55.68 
Kastamonu, Çankırı, Sinop  TR82 52.30 56.46 50.40 30.31  30.81  30.44 
Erzurum, Erzincan, Bayburt  TRA1 79.13 83.11 77.71 61.79  58.97  55.54 
Ağrı, Kars, Iğdır, Ardahan  TRA2 89.99 88.22 87.01 75.95  75.79  75.49 
Malatya, Elazığ, Bingöl, Tunceli  TRB1 81.82 80.77 80.15 46.13  45.62  43.13 
Van, Muş, Bitlis, Hakkari  TRB2 93.68 97.04 93.31 87.56  85.79  85.39 
Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır  TRC2 79.27 78.99 75.66 56.97  50.44  37.37 
Mardin, Batman, Şırnak, Siirt  TRC3 90.94 61.58 56.73 53.74  49.63  47.32 
Source: Calculated using TURKSTAT data                   
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Table A2: Share of Public Sector in Manufacturing Value Added by Regions 
(percent) 
Industrial  zones      1983 1984 1985 1998  1999  2000 
İstanbul  TR10 19.84 16.10 16.01  4.34  5.14  5.35 
İzmir  TR31 43.46 43.40 48.12 50.05  51.24  34.55 
Bursa, Eskişehir, Bilecik  TR41 19.88 21.34 15.90  2.60  3.10  2.43 
Kocaeli, Sakarya, Düzce, Bolu, Yalova  TR42 54.94 47.86 46.97 34.03  29.32  24.01 
Ankara  TR51 54.02 54.16 57.72 13.95  12.82  8.87 
Adana, Mersin  TR62 13.36 16.71 55.94 34.86  48.72  39.18 
Hinterlands                      
Tekirdağ, Edirne, Kırklareli  TR21 7.30 4.36 6.21 2.51  3.64  4.71 
Manisa, Afyonkarahisar, Kütahya, Uşak  TR33 33.77 32.86 27.86 15.68  13.00  11.40 
Emerging regions                      
Aydın, Denizli, Muğla  TR32 36.20 38.85 30.59  1.09  0.12  0.82 
Kayseri, Sivas, Yozgat  TR72 27.92 33.99 26.26  9.36  11.90  9.97 
Gaziantep, Adıyaman, Kilis  TRC1 43.15 25.85 29.32  9.45  6.45  7.23 
     
Minor industrial regions                      
Balıkesir, Çanakkale  TR22 36.57 27.09 42.50  9.07  4.37  3.52 
Konya, Karaman  TR52 64.85 43.43 53.80 25.56  23.54  29.55 
Hatay, Kahramanmaraş, Osmaniye  TR63 79.22 75.10 69.12 51.89  54.51  34.10 
Zonguldak, Karabük, Bartın  TR81 92.04 94.06 92.19 54.48  44.69  40.57 
Samsun, Tokat, Çorum, Amasya  TR83 75.06 70.24 69.99 53.83  64.72  66.21 
Trabzon, Ordu, Giresun, Rize, Artvin, Gümüşhane  TR90 63.56 56.58 48.89 38.97  27.51  39.79 
Poorly industrialized regions                      
Antalya, Isparta, Burdur  TR61 40.85 39.39 42.07 23.29  17.28  24.15 
Kırıkkale, Aksaray, Niğde, Nevşehir, Kırşehir  TR71 26.09 25.30 38.55 89.71  91.38  90.96 
Kastamonu, Çankırı, Sinop  TR82 46.27 47.59 43.27 25.08  40.57  16.11 
Erzurum, Erzincan, Bayburt  TRA1 79.06 85.17 76.46 46.17  58.03  30.27 
Ağrı, Kars, Iğdır, Ardahan  TRA2 93.32  0.00 58.73 28.59  45.57  51.10 
Malatya, Elazığ, Bingöl, Tunceli  TRB1 93.08 92.82 93.66 74.71  68.27  83.58 
Van, Muş, Bitlis, Hakkari  TRB2 95.67 95.26 93.38 73.58  86.33  78.15 
Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır  TRC2 78.35 86.40 87.83 73.76  69.30  40.67 
Mardin, Batman, Şırnak, Siirt  TRC3 76.63 83.00 89.89 68.67  70.21  65.03 
Source: Calculated using TURKSTAT data                      
 
  Dogruel&Dogruel, April 2011  23
Table A3: Manufacturing Employment by Regions 
Industrial zones     1983 1984 1985 1998 1999 2000
İstanbul  TR10 264,137 269,353 281,969 331,638 300,871 300,533 
İzmir  TR31 79,063 84,066 86,040  104,145 90,466 94,091 
Bursa, Eskişehir, Bilecik  TR41 63,658 68,495 75,421  143,706  130,100  133,551 
Kocaeli, Sakarya, Düzce, Bolu, Yalova  TR42 70,126 71,671 70,654 99,656 95,210 97,858 
Ankara  TR51 48,284 48,558 53,709 61,826 59,299 59,013 
Adana, Mersin  TR62 54,248 56,450 54,049 51,399 47,993 45,725 
Hinterlands                       
Tekirdağ, Edirne, Kırklareli  TR21 25,030 26,505 26,449 72,126 65,382 70,341 
Manisa, Afyonkarahisar, Kütahya, Uşak  TR33 25,377 27,223 31,498 43,542 42,568 42,371 
Emerging regions                       
Aydın, Denizli, Muğla  TR32 19,605 20,097 20,562 47,658 45,154 50,355 
Kayseri, Sivas, Yozgat  TR72 16,406 20,749 22,357 32,553 30,250 30,995 
Gaziantep, Adıyaman, Kilis  TRC1  9,903 10,193 11,921 25,629 24,899 26,931 
     
Minor industrial regions                       
Balıkesir, Çanakkale  TR22 14,003 14,140 14,148 17,010 16,753 17,767 
Konya, Karaman  TR52 20,960 21,308 22,654 25,539 23,832 23,307 
Hatay, Kahramanmaraş, Osmaniye  TR63 21,146 21,019 21,584 22,203 21,354 20,153 
Zonguldak, Karabük, Bartın  TR81 23,833 23,368 23,785 19,082 18,422 18,160 
Samsun, Tokat, Çorum, Amasya  TR83 24,613 25,029 25,208 21,414 20,438 19,946 
Trabzon, Ordu, Giresun, Rize, Artvin, Gümüşhane  TR90 32,490 33,629 33,182 27,014 24,256 23,178 
Poorly industrialized regions                       
Antalya, Isparta, Burdur  TR61 12,243 12,053 12,976 13,468 12,040 11,760 
Kırıkkale, Aksaray, Niğde, Nevşehir, Kırşehir  TR71 4,499 5,280 5,785  13,392  12,706  12,265 
Kastamonu, Çankırı, Sinop  TR82 4,885 5,420 6,178 6,262 5,979 5,671 
Erzurum, Erzincan, Bayburt  TRA1 5,396 5,353 5,702 3,290 3,395 3,403 
Ağrı, Kars, Iğdır, Ardahan  TRA2 1,348 2,393 2,271 1,983 1,863 1,836 
Malatya, Elazığ, Bingöl, Tunceli  TRB1 11,738 11,595 11,592 12,743 11,987 12,020 
Van, Muş, Bitlis, Hakkari  TRB2 2,011 2,464 2,601 2,620 2,730 2,855 
Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır  TRC2 3,198 3,627 3,697 2,359 2,619 3,080 
Mardin, Batman, Şırnak, Siirt  TRC3 4,016 1,041 1,604 1,230 1,356 1,509 
Source: Calculated using TURKSTAT data                   
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Table A4: Regional Distribution of Total Manufacturing Employment 
(percent) 
Industrial zones     1983 1984 1985 1998 1999 2000
İstanbul  TR10 30.63 30.23 30.40  27.56  27.06  26.63 
İzmir  TR31 9.17 9.43 9.28  8.65  8.14  8.34 
Bursa, Eskişehir, Bilecik  TR41 7.38 7.69 8.13  11.94  11.70  11.83 
Kocaeli, Sakarya, Düzce, Bolu, Yalova  TR42 8.13 8.04 7.62  8.28  8.56  8.67 
Ankara  TR51 5.60 5.45 5.79  5.14  5.33  5.23 
Adana, Mersin  TR62 6.29 6.34 5.83  4.27  4.32  4.05 
Hinterlands                      
Tekirdağ, Edirne, Kırklareli  TR21 2.90 2.97 2.85  5.99  5.88  6.23 
Manisa, Afyonkarahisar, Kütahya, Uşak  TR33 2.94 3.06 3.40  3.62  3.83  3.75 
Emerging regions                      
Aydın, Denizli, Muğla  TR32 2.27 2.26 2.22  3.96  4.06  4.46 
Kayseri, Sivas, Yozgat  TR72 1.90 2.33 2.41  2.70  2.72  2.75 
Gaziantep, Adıyaman, Kilis  TRC1 1.15 1.14 1.29  2.13  2.24  2.39 
     
Minor industrial regions                      
Balıkesir, Çanakkale  TR22 1.62 1.59 1.53  1.41  1.51  1.57 
Konya, Karaman  TR52 2.43 2.39 2.44  2.12  2.14  2.06 
Hatay, Kahramanmaraş, Osmaniye  TR63 2.45 2.36 2.33  1.84  1.92  1.79 
Zonguldak, Karabük, Bartın  TR81 2.76 2.62 2.56  1.59  1.66  1.61 
Samsun, Tokat, Çorum, Amasya  TR83 2.85 2.81 2.72  1.78  1.84  1.77 
Trabzon, Ordu, Giresun, Rize, Artvin, Gümüşhane  TR90 3.77 3.77 3.58  2.24  2.18  2.05 
Poorly industrialized regions                      
Antalya, Isparta, Burdur  TR61 1.42 1.35 1.40  1.12  1.08  1.04 
Kırıkkale, Aksaray, Niğde, Nevşehir, Kırşehir  TR71 0.52 0.59 0.62  1.11  1.14  1.09 
Kastamonu, Çankırı, Sinop  TR82 0.57 0.61 0.67  0.52  0.54  0.50 
Erzurum, Erzincan, Bayburt  TRA1 0.63 0.60 0.61  0.27  0.31  0.30 
Ağrı, Kars, Iğdır, Ardahan  TRA2 0.16 0.27 0.24  0.16  0.17  0.16 
Malatya, Elazığ, Bingöl, Tunceli  TRB1 1.36 1.30 1.25  1.06  1.08  1.06 
Van, Muş, Bitlis, Hakkari  TRB2 0.23 0.28 0.28  0.22  0.25  0.25 
Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır  TRC2 0.37 0.41 0.40  0.20  0.24  0.27 
Mardin, Batman, Şırnak, Siirt  TRC3 0.47 0.12 0.17  0.10  0.12  0.13 
Source: Calculated using TURKSTAT data                      
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Table A5: Regional Distribution of Total Manufacturing Value Added 
(percent) 
Industrial  zones      1983 1984 1985  1998  1999  2000 
İstanbul  TR10 28.17 29.78 29.62  24.80  24.25  23.80 
İzmir  TR31 11.88 11.53 11.29  11.97  12.14  13.96 
Bursa, Eskişehir, Bilecik  TR41 5.90 6.18 7.49  8.86  9.01  9.41 
Kocaeli, Sakarya, Düzce, Bolu, Yalova  TR42 19.28 16.92 16.34  17.79  16.09  15.31 
Ankara  TR51 3.82 3.45 4.51  4.41  4.56  4.54 
Adana, Mersin  TR62  11.02 9.82 9.21  5.56  7.02  5.81 
Hinterlands                      
Tekirdağ, Edirne, Kırklareli  TR21 2.48 2.52 2.25  5.50  5.09  5.72 
Manisa, Afyonkarahisar, Kütahya, Uşak  TR33 1.51 1.74 2.29  2.90  3.01  2.89 
Emerging regions                      
Aydın, Denizli, Muğla  TR32 1.34 1.84 1.43  1.87  1.87  2.29 
Kayseri, Sivas, Yozgat  TR72 1.29 1.29 1.23  1.85  1.79  1.78 
Gaziantep, Adıyaman, Kilis  TRC1 0.59 0.66 0.66  1.33  0.98  1.59 
     
Minor industrial regions                      
Balıkesir, Çanakkale  TR22 1.41 1.50 1.65  1.60  1.62  1.76 
Konya, Karaman  TR52 1.41 1.71 1.17  1.40  1.25  1.28 
Hatay, Kahramanmaraş, Osmaniye  TR63 0.82 0.85 0.68  1.57  1.75  1.14 
Zonguldak, Karabük, Bartın  TR81 3.23 4.01 2.91  1.15  0.86  0.95 
Samsun, Tokat, Çorum, Amasya  TR83 0.95 1.29 1.11  1.26  1.54  1.39 
Trabzon, Ordu, Giresun, Rize, Artvin, Gümüşhane  TR90 1.25 1.18 1.41  1.00  1.05  1.08 
Poorly industrialized regions                      
Antalya, Isparta, Burdur  TR61 0.83 1.14 0.94  0.65  0.69  0.77 
Kırıkkale, Aksaray, Niğde, Nevşehir, Kırşehir  TR71 0.26 0.30 0.34  2.84  3.67  2.88 
Kastamonu, Çankırı, Sinop  TR82 0.21 0.18 0.25  0.28  0.21  0.30 
Erzurum, Erzincan, Bayburt  TRA1 0.35 0.36 0.31  0.12  0.15  0.15 
Ağrı, Kars, Iğdır, Ardahan  TRA2 0.04 0.00 0.02  0.05  0.05  0.06 
Malatya, Elazığ, Bingöl, Tunceli  TRB1 1.27 1.49 1.88  0.73  0.71  0.63 
Van, Muş, Bitlis, Hakkari  TRB2 0.09 0.03 0.13  0.03  0.13  0.11 
Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır  TRC2 0.11 0.15 0.28  0.19  0.18  0.19 
Mardin, Batman, Şırnak, Siirt  TRC3 0.52 0.10 0.59  0.28  0.32  0.21 
Source: Calculated using TURKSTAT data                      
 


























































































İstanbul TR10 28 31 28 26 24 24 24 23 16 17 16 15 15 15 12 11 11 10 16 16 13
İz m i r T R 3 1 1 5 1 2 1 4 1 39 1 0 1 0 1 07777777777 1 1 1 08
Bursa, Eskişe h i r ,  B i l e c i k T R 4 11 61 41 51 31 21 31 31 41 21 21 11 11 11 01 0 9 9 91 2 8 8
Kocaeli, Sakarya, Düzce, Bolu, Yalova TR42 24 23 23 22 21 21 21 22 14 15 14 15 14 13 12 11 11 11 15 11 8
Ankara TR51 23 25 24 26 23 25 24 24 18 16 15 15 14 13 15 14 13 12 16 16 15
A d a n a ,  M e r s i n T R 6 2 1 4 1 3 1 2 1 2 1 0 1 2 1 3 1 28888777555897
Hinterlands
Tekirdağ, Edirne, Kır k l a r e l i T R 2 1998788888887887654443
Manisa, Afyonkarahisar, Kütahya, Uşa k T R 3 3 1 5 1 5 1 8 1 7 1 4 1 3 1 4 1 4 1 0999 1 2 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 3
Emerging regions
Aydın, Denizli, Muğl a T R 3 29 1 0 1 0 1 299 1 0 1 1 1 0999 1 3 1 18897 1 0 1 29
K a y s e r i ,  S i v a s ,  Y o z g a t T R 7 2 1 2 1 0 1 0979999 1 09 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 09987
Gaziantep, Adıyaman, Kilis TRC1858989999999978756675
Minor industrial regions
Balık e s i r ,  Ç a n a k k a l e T R 2 2 1 2 1 3 1 0989997666666545777
K o n y a ,  K a r a m a n T R 5 2999988789 1 0 1 0 1 0999888887
Hatay, Kahramanmaraş,  O s m a n i y e T R 6 3566554544444422221212
Zonguldak, Karabük, Bartın T R 8 1 1 2 1 2 1 0977776666655430131
Samsun, Tokat, Çorum, Amasya TR83 16 16 17 18 15 16 17 17 16 17 17 17 18 15 15 11 9 9 10 9 11
Trabzon, Ordu, Giresun, Rize, Artvin, Gümüşhane TR90 55 55 55 55 58 60 59 59 59 57 58 59 59 58 59 59 56 55 53 53 53
Poorly industrialized regions 
A n t a l y a ,  I s p a r t a ,  B u r d u r T R 6 1 1 5 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 19999 1 1 1 0 1 0977786
Kırıkkale, Aksaray, Niğde, Nevşehir, Kırşe h i r T R 7 1777766678988 1 1 1 19664777
Kastamonu, Çankırı,  S i n o p T R 8 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 0 1 3 1 3 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 0655554
E r z u r u m ,  E r z i n c a n ,  B a y b u r t T R A 199 1 099998899 1 0 1 097334554
Ağrı, Kars, Iğdır, Ardahan TRA2666676677766767643333
Malatya, Elazığ,  B i n g ö l ,  T u n c e l i T R B 11 11 21 21 21 21 31 31 41 31 31 31 31 51 41 41 11 11 01 0 9 9
Van, Muş,  B i t l i s ,  H a k k a r i T R B 2 1 1 1 189 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 6 1 5 1 5 1 6 1 6 1 1 1 197778
Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır T R C 29 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 4 1 4 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 3 1 298776
Mardin, Batman, Şır n a k ,  S i i r t T R C 3433334554444452222212
Total 364 359 358 353 327 338 347 351 310 313 305 308 325 308 288 256 234 219 254 247 226
Source: Calculated using TURKSTAT data